Another scenario by Brian Skyrms is "The Pyromaniac",  in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown "Q radiation". Correlatively, might JTB be almost correct as it is — in the sense of being accurate about almost all actual or possible cases of knowledge? A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Hence, they have a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field.
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Gettier problem - Wikipedia
One important view of this sort is that defended by Edward Craig After all, if we seek to eliminate all luck whatsoever from the production of the justified true belief if knowledge is thereby to be present prooblem, then we are again endorsing a version of infallibilism as described in section 7. Chapter 4 discusses, in again a lot of detail, possible objections to the argument presented in Chapter 2.
But the Infallibility Proposal — when combined with that acceptance of our general fallibility — would imply that we are not knowers at all.
Goldman is the seminal defense of reliabilism about justification; reliabilism is extended to knowledge in Goldman In a scenario known as "The sheep getter the field", Roderick Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone is standing outside a field looking at something that looks like a sheep although in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding geytier logical expressions or concepts.
Peirce emphasized fallibilismconsidered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry,  and in defined truth as follows: And just how weakened, exactly, may your evidence for p become — courtesy of the elimination of false elements within it — before it is too weak to be part of making your belief that p knowledge?
Would getiter Appropriate Causality Proposal thereby be satisfied — so that in this altered Case I belief b would now be knowledge?
Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. Since the recipe is a general one, it appears to be applicable to any condition one might add to the JTB theory, so long as it does not itself entail truth. Let us therefore consider the No False Evidence Proposal. Why do epistemologists interpret the Gettier challenge in that stronger way? Why should we think that knowledge has an analysis?
And he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has ten coins in their pocket. This thesis is what I call the Divorce thesis: Knowledge, Misc in Epistemology. Whether it can be weakened without becoming subject to a counterexample should then be checked. In this paper I shall argue that most other forms of contextualism sufferthe same fate as Lewis's.
And as section 8 indicated there are epistemologists who think that a lucky derivation of a true belief is not a geytier to know that truth.
The Gettier Problem - Bibliography - PhilPapers
However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. Ordinary knowledge is thereby constituted, with that absence of notable luck being part of what makes instances of ordinary knowledge ordinary in our ggettier.
I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields.
The Road to Universal Logic.
The Gettier Problem No Longer a Problem
Yet this was due to the intervention of some good luck. Is it this luck that needs to be eliminated if the situation is gehtier become one in which the belief in question is knowledge? Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal modulo a few details could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well.
A person knows P, he problsm, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of How best might that question be answered?
Sandra and Daniel might in some sense be in the same epistemic positionwhere the only difference is that the question is more important to Sandra.
The Analysis of Knowledge
First, some objects of knowledge might be aspects of the world which prolem unable ever to have causal influences. A sensitivity condition on knowledge, combined with the nonskeptical claim that there is ordinary knowledge, seems to imply such abominable conjunctions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: But how much indirectness is too much?